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Abstract 26 
Although it has long been known that time is a cue to causation, recent work with adults has 27 
demonstrated that causality can also influence the experience of time. In causal reordering 28 
(Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 2013, 2016) adults tend to report the causally consistent order of 29 
events, rather than the correct temporal order. However, the effect has yet to be demonstrated 30 
in children. Across four pre-registered experiments, 4- to 10-year-old children (N=813) and 31 
adults (N=178) watched a 3-object Michotte-style ‘pseudocollision’. While in the canonical 32 
version of the clip object A collided with B, which then collided with object C (order: ABC), 33 
the pseudocollision involved the same spatial array of objects but featured object C moving 34 
before object B (order: ACB), with no collision between B and C. Participants were asked to 35 
judge the temporal order of events and whether object B collided with C. Across all age 36 
groups, participants were significantly more likely to judge that B collided with C in the 3-37 
object pseudocollision than in a 2-object control clip (where clear causal direction was 38 
lacking), despite the spatiotemporal relations between B and C being identical in the two 39 
clips (Experiments 1—3). Collision judgements and temporal order judgements were not 40 
entirely consistent, with some participants—particularly in the younger age range—basing 41 
their temporal order judgements on spatial rather than temporal information (Experiment 4). 42 
We conclude that in both children and adults, rather than causal impressions being 43 
determined only by the basic spatial-temporal properties of object movement, schemata are 44 
used in a top-down manner when interpreting perceptual displays.  45 
 46 
Keywords: causality, causal perception, cognitive development, Michottean launching, 47 
temporal cognition, time perception 48 
 49 
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Causality Influences Children’s and Adults’ Experience of Temporal Order 50 
The ability to learn about and represent causal relations is fundamental to our ability 51 
to navigate and understand the world as it enables us to interpret, explain and thus predict, 52 
events in our environment. A large body of research suggests that from a young age, children 53 
represent causal structures and use this information to guide their inferences and behaviour 54 
(see Muentener & Bonawitz, 2017; Sobel & Legare, 2014 for recent reviews). There is 55 
evidence that causal knowledge contributes to the development of children’s cognitive skills 56 
in a variety of domains (e.g., physical reasoning, Baillargeon, 2004; moral reasoning, 57 
Hamlin, 2013; generating explanations, Legare, 2012), thus demonstrating that causality 58 
plays a central role in our experience of the world from early in life. 59 
It has long been known that temporal cues strongly influence people’s causal 60 
judgements. Both adults’ (e.g., Buehner & May, 2003; Lagnado & Sloman, 2006) and 61 
children’s (e.g., Bullock & Gelman, 1979; McCormack et al., 2015; Mendelson & Shultz, 62 
1976; Rankin & McCormack, 2013; Schlottmann et al., 1999) causal judgements show 63 
sensitivity to the principles of temporal priority (causes must precede their effects) and 64 
temporal contiguity (causally related events typically occur close together in time). More 65 
recently, it has become apparent that the relations between time and causality are in fact 66 
bidirectional—just as temporal cues influence our causal judgements, causal beliefs, in turn, 67 
influence the experience of time. Empirically, this influence of causal beliefs on temporal 68 
experience has been demonstrated in studies of two effects: causal binding and causal 69 
reordering. Studies of causal binding have shown that if one event A is believed to be the 70 
cause of another event B, the interval between the two events is perceived as shorter in 71 
duration than the same objective interval where the two events are not causally linked 72 
(Buehner 2012; 2015; Buehner & Humphreys, 2009). This represents a quantitative shift in 73 
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the perception of the temporal duration of an interval, such that causally-related events are 74 
drawn towards one another, or ‘bound’ together in time.  75 
A small number of recent studies have also demonstrated that causal beliefs can 76 
influence not only the subjective interval between events but also the temporal order in which 77 
the events are perceived to occur. In causal reordering (Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 2013; 78 
2016) the temporal order in which events are perceived to have occurred is reversed, so that 79 
the experienced order of events is in line with causality. That is, if participants have a 80 
background belief that A is a cause of B, they are likely to report that A happened before B 81 
even when shown a sequence of events in which B happened first.  In the first study to 82 
demonstrate causal reordering, participants interacted with an on-screen ‘physics world’ 83 
consisting of animated objects with different properties. After learning the properties of the 84 
objects and the causal relations between them, participants watched a clip that violated the 85 
learned causal order of events (i.e., if they had learned that A caused B, they saw a clip in 86 
which B happened before A). Participants were significantly more likely to report that events 87 
occurred in the order consistent with their causal beliefs than the objective temporal order 88 
(Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 2013).  89 
Further evidence that causal beliefs influence adults’ experience of the temporal order 90 
of events comes from a study by Desantis and colleagues (2016). In this study participants 91 
watched a random-dot-kinematogram (RDK) on a computer screen and learned that pressing 92 
one key (e.g., left) caused the RDK motion to become briefly coherent in one direction (e.g., 93 
upwards), and pressing a different key (e.g., right) led to coherent motion in the opposite 94 
direction (e.g., downwards). Having learned this association, in a critical test phase, 95 
participants continued to execute keypresses, but sometimes the coherent motion of the RDK 96 
occurred before the keypress. For these trials, participants were more likely to (incorrectly) 97 
report that the motion occurred after their keypress when coherent motion was in the 98 
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expected (i.e. learnt) direction, compared with when it was in the unexpected, incongruent 99 
direction. This finding is indicative of causal reordering because participants apparently 100 
perceived events to occur in the order that reflected their learned causal beliefs (Desantis et 101 
al., 2016).  102 
The above causal reordering studies were based on causal relations that participants 103 
learned in an initial training phase. On the basis of this evidence alone, it is not possible to 104 
determine whether the reordering effect is dependent on recently learned rules about 105 
unfamiliar causes and effects, or whether it might represent a more general phenomenon that 106 
occurs in any situation that evokes an impression of causality. In addition, the Desantis et al. 107 
(2016) study involved intentional action by the participant, thus the reordering effect found 108 
might not be explained solely by causal beliefs (e.g., illusion of control could also play a 109 
role). To address these issues, Bechlivanidis and Lagnado (2016) designed a ‘one shot’ 110 
experiment that involved showing participants a single brief clip. The clip was based on a 111 
Michottean launching event (i.e. a simple collision between horizontally arranged two-112 
dimensional objects), adapted to involve three objects (ABC) instead of the typical two. 113 
Crucially, the third object in line (C) moved before the second object in line (B); i.e., the 114 
effect occurred before its presumed cause (see e.g., Figure 2a). Participants were significantly 115 
more likely to report perceiving that the events happened in an order consistent with 116 
causation (ABC) than in the objective temporal order (ACB). Participants also tended to 117 
(incorrectly) report that B made C move, suggesting that presumed causality—in the form of 118 
a collision between B and C—was the basis on which reordering occurred (Bechlivanidis & 119 
Lagnado, 2016). 120 
Taken together, these studies provide compelling evidence that adults temporally 121 
reorder events in line with their assumptions about causality, regardless of whether those 122 
assumptions are the result of recent learning or are based on perceptual cues. However, 123 
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nothing is currently known about the developmental origins of this phenomenon, despite the 124 
potential for developmental research to enhance our understanding of the nature of the links 125 
between causal and temporal cognition. Children’s causal cognition has been studied 126 
extensively (see Muentener & Bonawitz, 2017; Sobel & Legare, 2014 for recent reviews) and 127 
even infants show some sensitivity to causality in Michottean launching displays (e.g., Leslie 128 
& Keeble, 1987; Mascalzoni et al., 2013; Oakes, 1994; Schlottmann et al., 2002), but whether 129 
children’s causal impressions are strong and reliable enough to modulate their temporal order 130 
perception, as is true for adults, remains an open question.  131 
Research on whether causal beliefs can affect children’s temporal perception has so 132 
far been limited to a small number of developmental studies of causal binding—the perceived 133 
shortening of duration between two events that are believed to be causally related. Cavazzana 134 
and colleagues (2014, 2017) investigated the binding effect in 8- to 11-year-old children and 135 
adults. In each trial, participants watched letters of the alphabet rapidly flash up on a screen in 136 
a random order, and had to report which letter was on the screen when target events occurred. 137 
In some trials participants heard two tones (which were causally unrelated to one another) 138 
and in other trials participants pressed a key that resulted in a tone (causally related events), 139 
with the duration between the pairs of events identical in both cases. The adults’ judgements 140 
of which letters were on the screen when these target events occurred revealed the classic 141 
binding effect—the causally related keypress and tone were perceived as occurring closer 142 
together in time compared to the causally unrelated tones. However, the researchers failed to 143 
find evidence of causal binding in the children, leading them to conclude that the effect 144 
emerges late in development and may be linked to the development of higher-order cognitive 145 
processes (Cavazzana, Begliomini, & Bisiacchi, 2014, 2017).  146 
Although Cavazzana et al. concluded that this type of binding was a late-emerging 147 
phenomenon, their findings contrast with those of some recent studies using simplified child-148 
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friendly tasks. In these tasks, rather than retrospectively reporting the time at which an event 149 
occurred, participants either anticipated when they expected a target event (e.g., a rocket on a 150 
screen launching) to occur following an initial event (keypress or non-causal signal, Blakey et 151 
al., 2018), or gave a categorical estimation of the interval between the two events (Lorimer et 152 
al., under review). Children in both of these studies showed a binding effect—they were more 153 
likely to perceive the duration between two events to be shorter when there was a causal 154 
connection between them (i.e., when the rocket launch was caused by a keypress as opposed 155 
to preceded by an arbitrary signal). These findings suggest that susceptibility to causal 156 
binding is present in children as young as four years and that the magnitude of the binding 157 
effect does not increase developmentally, even into adulthood (Blakey et al., 2018; Lorimer 158 
et al., under review). Thus, it appears that, rather than being a late emerging phenomenon as 159 
suggested by the results of Cavazanna et al., causal binding reflects a fundamental way in 160 
which cognition shapes perception, and, at least from four years, is not modulated either by 161 
increased experience of causal relations or higher-order cognitive/reasoning processes that 162 
are known to change developmentally.  163 
Causal binding and reordering effects are both examples of causal beliefs influencing 164 
temporal experience, suggesting that the relationship between time and causality is 165 
bidirectional. It thus seems intuitively plausible that the emergence of these effects may 166 
follow the same developmental trajectory. However, it is difficult to generate developmental 167 
predictions about causal reordering effects based on studies of causal binding, because there 168 
are no detailed models of these effects that assume they have a common basis (indeed, there 169 
is considerable disagreement over the mechanisms underpinning causal binding, e.g., 170 
Borhani, Beck, & Haggard, 2017; Buehner, 2012; Faro, McGill, & Hastie, 2013; Merchant & 171 
Yarrow, 2016). Nevertheless, the recent studies on causal binding in children help motivate 172 
an examination of whether causal reordering is also observable in children. The aim of the 173 
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present study was to investigate for the first time whether children as young as four years are 174 
susceptible to the causal reordering effect, and if so, whether and how this changes across 175 
development. If we find evidence of reordering from a young age, this would provide further 176 
evidence for an early-developing bidirectional relation between time and causality, where 177 
causality already plays a critical role in children’s interpretation of the environment, 178 
including its temporal features. On the other hand, if children do not reorder, or if 179 
susceptibility to reordering increases with age, this would suggest that the role of causal 180 
beliefs in interpreting temporal order develops slowly, perhaps as a result of increasing 181 
experience with causal systems.  182 
The Michottean launching paradigm used by Bechlivanidis and Lagnado (2016) 183 
provides a very useful context in which to examine this issue, because the task does not 184 
involve children having to acquire familiarity with a new set of causal relations or make 185 
effortful causal inferences. While there is long-standing debate over how best to interpret the 186 
infancy data which has used Michottean-type tasks (Saxe & Carey, 2006; Cohen & Amsell, 187 
1998; Schlottmann, 2000; White, 2017), we can be confident that even preschoolers have a 188 
distinctive impression of physical causation when they see prototypical launch events 189 
(Schlottmann, Cole, Watts, & White, 2013; Schlottmann, Allan, Linderoth, & Hesketh, 190 
2002). Although in some circumstances young children are somewhat more tolerant than 191 
adults in ascribing causation to launching events that deviate from the prototypical launching 192 
sequence in most respects their explicit causal judgements are remarkably similar to those of 193 
adults (Schlottmann et al., 2013; see also Bechlivanidis, Schlottmann & Lagnado (2019) for 194 
recent evidence that adults are in fact more tolerant of deviation than previously assumed).  195 
General Method 196 
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Approval for this study (Experiments 1—4) was granted by Cardiff University School 197 
of Psychology Ethics Committee, EC.16.02.09.4448R, ‘Time and Causality in Cognitive 198 
Development’. All studies were pre-registered and are available at the following links: 199 
Experiment1: https://osf.io/nqbtm/, Experiment 2: 200 
https://osf.io/vcesk/register/565fb3678c5e4a66b5582f67, Experiment 3: 201 
http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=z7e5xr; Experiment 4: 202 
http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=ip226r.  203 
Participants 204 
For each experiment we initially aimed to recruit approximately 30 participants per 205 
age group and use a within-subjects design (for the sake of economic use of participants), 206 
with participants viewing both of the critical clips (there were two in each experiment, the 3-207 
object pseudocollision and the control clip) in a counterbalanced order, yielding two 208 
conditions (pseudocollision first or second). Once we reached this sample size we tested for 209 
order effects; specifically, for each age group we tested whether the order in which 210 
participants saw the two critical clips influenced their responses for either of our measures 211 
(TOJ and CJ). For all four experiments, critical clip order influenced performance for at least 212 
one age group on at least one measure (see supplementary Table S1 Figure S1); thus, in each 213 
case we switched to a between-subjects design, whereby we proceeded to collect additional 214 
data to give approximately 30 participants per age group per condition, and only analysed the 215 
first of the two critical clips participants watched. That is, in the analyses reported below, 216 
participants contributed data points for either the pseudocollision clip or the control clip.  217 
The exact number of participants per experiment was determined by availability in 218 
schools and museums. Specifically, we did not turn away anyone who wanted to participate 219 
while we were in a given setting. To enable us to examine performance differences across 220 
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development and compare children and adults within the same model the child sample for 221 
each experiment was divided into multiple age groups.  222 
All participants were tested individually. Adults were either tested in a room at a 223 
university (undergraduate students) or at a local science museum (museum visitors). The 224 
adults tested at a university received course credit for participating. Children were either 225 
tested in a room at their school or at a local science museum and received a sticker for 226 
participating. 227 
Materials  228 
All experiments were programmed in Adobe Flex 4.6 and presented to participants on 229 
an Acer TravelMate P236 13.3” laptop. Examples of the clips presented in Experiment 1 are 230 
depicted in Figures 1 and 2. 231 
Design 232 
All Participants only took part in one of the four experiments. The following variables 233 
were randomized across participants: direction of object motion in clips (left to right, right to 234 
left); practice clip order; colour of the shapes (which varied between experiments). 235 
Coding and preliminary analyses 236 
For each critical clip we coded participants’ responses to (a) the TOJ question (shape 237 
selected (A, B, C) and whether it was correct/incorrect) and (b) the CJ question (yes/no and 238 
whether it was correct/incorrect). For each experiment we ran preliminary analyses to check 239 
for an effect of direction of motion (left-right or right-left) on either of our response variables. 240 
As we found no significant influence of motion direction, data were collapsed across this 241 
variable for all subsequent analyses. 242 
Experiment 1 243 
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In Experiment 1, we modified Bechlivanidis and Lagnado’s (2016) Experiment 1 to 244 
make it more appropriate for young children. The critical clips were identical in terms of their 245 
spatiotemporal features to those used in the original study. However, whereas participants in 246 
Bechlivanidis and Lagnado’s (2016) experiment were required to order all of the events that 247 
occurred via drag and drop, we greatly simplified the response variables to reduce task 248 
demands. In the critical clips for our task, participants were asked a single temporal order 249 
judgement (TOJ) question (“Which square started moving last?”) and a single collision 250 
judgement (CJ) question (“Did square B bump into square C, yes or no?” see Method for 251 
further details). We also introduced 4 non-causal practice clips (two involving two objects 252 
and two involving three objects; Figure 1a—b) that participants watched before viewing the 253 
critical clips, to familiarize participants with the type of clip they would be watching and 254 
what they should be attending to. 255 
Method 256 
Participants. Our final sample consisted of 61 adults (41 female, 3-object: N = 31, 257 
Mage =29 years; 2-object: N = 30, Mage = 23 years) and 282 children (164 female). An 258 
additional four children were tested but excluded because they were inattentive (N = 3) or did 259 
not understand the task instructions (N = 1). The child sample was divided into 4 age groups 260 
per condition: 4- to 6-year-olds (3-object: N = 35, Mage = 5 years 8 months; 2-object: N = 35, 261 
Mage = 5 years 4 months), 6- to 7-year-olds (3-object: N = 36, Mage = 7 years 2 months; 2-262 
object: N = 35, Mage = 7 years 0 months), 7- to 9-year-olds (3-object: N = 35, Mage = 8 years 8 263 
months; 2-object: N = 35, Mage = 8 years 5 months) and 9- to 10-year-olds (3-object: N = 36, 264 
Mage = 9 years 11 months; 2-object: N = 35, Mage = 9 years 9 months).  265 
Procedure. Participants were told that they would watch some short clips of squares 266 
moving around on the screen and answer some questions about what they saw. They were 267 
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told that they would only get to see each clip once so they should make sure to pay attention, 268 
and that they would know when each clip was going to start because they would see a ‘clock’ 269 
fill in from white to black (Figures 1 and 2), after which the squares would start to move, 270 
which was then demonstrated to them once. 271 
Practice clips. Participants first watched 4 non-causal practice clips (see Figure 1a), 272 
and were asked a TOJ question after each clip. At the start of each practice clip the squares 273 
were aligned vertically in columns at one side of the screen and they started to move 274 
horizontally one at a time, so there was no implied causal connection between the motion 275 
onsets of the squares.1 After each practice clip, participants saw a screen with the squares in 276 
their final configuration (i.e., where they ended up after the motion), and were asked a single 277 
TOJ question: either, “Which square started moving first?” or “Which square started moving 278 
last?” to establish their experience of the motion onset of the squares. These questions were 279 
asked in an alternating order across the four practice clips. The rationale for asking both of 280 
these questions was to encourage participants to attend to the motion of all of the squares. 281 
Given that children may not always accurately interpret the words “before” and “after” until 282 
at least 5 years of age (e.g., Blything & Cain 2016; Blything, Davies & Cain, 2015) we 283 
deliberately avoided the use of these terms.  284 
Figure 1 about here 285 
 Critical clips. The critical clips consisted of a 2-object control clip and a 3-object 286 
“pseudocollision” clip (Figure 2) presented in a counterbalanced order. The shapes in the 287 
critical clips – which were all squares in Experiment 1 – will henceforth be labelled A, B, and 288 
C. At the start of each critical clip the shapes were aligned horizontally. In the 3-object 289 
 
1 White (2017) reported strong impressions of causality for an array of four vertically aligned objects that were 
simultaneously ‘launched’. However, the displays used in his study were very different from our practice clips 
where the objects moved separately and there was no ‘launcher’ object.  
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pseudocollision (Figure 2a), square A moved towards square B and stopped adjacent to it; 290 
immediately after this, square C started moving away from square B, and after 350 ms, 291 
square B started moving away from square A; at no stage did square B make contact with 292 
square C. All shapes moved at a speed of 30 mm/s. The 2-object control clip was identical to 293 
the 3-object pseudocollision, except that square A was not present (Figure 2b). Critically, the 294 
relative onset of motion of squares B and C was exactly the same in both clips.  295 
As in the practice clips the shapes remained in their final positions after each critical 296 
clip, and participants were asked a TOJ: “Which square started moving last?” This form of 297 
words was used rather than the more straightforward “Which square moved last?” because 298 
squares B and C stopped moving simultaneously (and so technically they both moved last). 299 
Participants were also asked a collision judgement (CJ) question about shapes B and C: “Did 300 
the (e.g.) black square (B) bump into the (e.g.) red square (C), yes or no?” and the 301 
experimenter pointed at the relevant squares on the screen as they asked this question. The 302 
aim of asking this was to establish whether children had the impression that B had collided 303 
with C.  304 
Figure 2 about here 305 
Pre-registered confirmatory analyses. To establish which of the age groups tested 306 
were susceptible to causal reordering, for each age group we used Chi-square tests to 307 
compare participants’ TOJ and CJ responses in the 2-object control clip and the 3-object 308 
pseudocollision (as a reminder, these clips were identical except for the inclusion/exclusion 309 
of object A). Where the assumptions for using the chi-square test were not met (i.e., expected 310 
values of < 5 in one or more cells) we used Fisher’s Exact Test. If participants were 311 
reordering events in line with an impression of causality, we would expect a significantly 312 
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greater proportion of participants’ TOJs and CJs to be accurate in the 2-object control clip 313 
than in the 3-object pseudocollision.  314 
Exploratory analyses. To further examine developmental changes in reordering we 315 
used binomial logistic regression conducted in R (R Core Team, 2017) to ascertain the effect 316 
of age group on the likelihood of responding correctly to (a) the TOJ question and (b) the CJ 317 
question for the 3-object pseudocollision. If the models revealed a significant effect of age 318 
group, planned pairwise comparisons were conducted with Tukey-adjusted p-values for 319 
multiple comparisons, to establish which age groups differed from one another. Correlation 320 
between our two measures (TOJs and CJs) was assessed by calculating Phi coefficients, 321 
which is a measure of association between two binary variables. Specifically, we were 322 
interested to know whether participants who reordered events B and C were more likely to 323 
report perceiving a collision between these two objects (and vice versa). 324 
Results 325 
Following Bechlivanidis and Lagnado (2016) and our pre-registered analysis plan, for 326 
the following analyses we excluded participants who, following the TOJ question, gave the 327 
nonsensical response that square A started moving last. This resulted in the exclusion of 328 
28/132 children (14 4- to 6-year-olds; seven 6- to 7-year-olds; six 7- to 9-year-olds; one 9- to 329 
10-year-old) from the group who contributed data on the 3-object pseudocollision clip. No 330 
adults needed to be excluded on this basis.  331 
Practice clips. Performance in the 2-object practice clips ranged from 69% correct 332 
responses (4- to 6-year-olds) to 93% correct responses (adults). Performance in the 3-object 333 
practice clips ranged from 60% correct responses (4- to 6-year-olds) to 94% correct responses 334 
(adults, see Table S2 for full details). 335 
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Pre-registered confirmatory analyses. Across all age groups, the majority of 336 
participants responded correctly to the TOJ question (that B moved last) in the 2-object 337 
control clip (Figure 3a). Participants in all age groups were significantly more likely to 338 
respond correctly (say B started moving last) in the 2-object control clip than the 3-object 339 
pseudocollision (Chi-square tests: p < 0.001 for all, Table 1). Participants in all age groups 340 
were also significantly more likely to respond correctly (no) to the CJ question (e.g., “did the 341 
green (B) square bump into the red (C) square, yes or no?”, see Figure 3b) in the 2-object 342 
control clip than the 3-object pseudocollision (Chi-square tests: p ≤ 0.001 for all, Table 1). 343 
Figure 3 about here 344 
Table 1 about here 345 
Exploratory analyses. Logistic regression revealed that participants’ tendency to 346 
report the correct order of events (TOJ question) in the pseudocollision was significantly 347 
influenced by age group (Wald χ2 = 10.68, df = 4, p = 0.030). Posthoc contrasts with Tukey 348 
adjusted p-values for multiple comparisons revealed a significant difference between adults 349 
and 9- to 10-year-olds (log odds ratio = 1.54, p = 0.036), with adults being more likely to 350 
respond correctly/less likely to reorder. There were no other significant differences between 351 
groups after adjusting for multiple comparisons (p ≥ 0.124 for all other pairs of age groups, 352 
Table S3). Participants’ tendency to report perceiving a collision between objects B and C 353 
(CJ question) in the pseudocollision was also significantly influenced by age group (Wald χ2 354 
= 10.43, df = 4, p = 0.034). Posthoc contrasts with Tukey adjusted p-values for multiple 355 
comparisons revealed a significant difference between 9- to 10-year-olds and 7- to 9-year-356 
olds (log odds ratio = 1.72, p = 0.038), with the older children being more likely to perceive a 357 
collision. There were no other significant differences between age groups in responses to the 358 
CJ question after adjusting for multiple comparisons (p ≥ 0.470 for all other pairwise 359 
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comparisons). These patterns of responding with age group as a categorical predictor were in 360 
keeping with analyses of child data only when age in years was included as a continuous 361 
predictor (see Table S6). TOJs and CJs were significantly associated for the 3-object 362 
pseudocollision—participants who reordered events B and C were more likely to report 363 
perceiving a collision between those objects (Phi = 0.26, p = 0.002, see Table S7 for details 364 
per age group). 365 
Discussion 366 
Across all of the age groups tested, participants were significantly more likely to 367 
report the correct order of events (say that square B started moving last) in the 2-object 368 
control clip than the 3-object pseudocollision clip, despite the relative onset of motion of 369 
squares B and C being identical in both clips. The results for the 2-object clip provide 370 
evidence that participants of all ages were able to perceptually distinguish the relative onset 371 
of motion of squares B and C, as they almost always gave the correct response to the TOJ 372 
question in this case. This suggests that participants’ TOJs were influenced by the inclusion 373 
of square A, which gave the clip clear causal direction. In addition, all participants were 374 
significantly less likely to report perceiving contact between objects B and C in the 2-object 375 
control clip than the 3-object pseudocollision (i.e, they were more likely to correctly respond 376 
“no” to the CJ question in the former), which indicates that the causal impression generated 377 
by the pseudocollision was the basis for reordering. 378 
Adults in the present experiment were less likely to reorder than in Bechlivanidis and 379 
Lagnado’s (2016, Experiment 1) original one-shot study (42% vs. 83% reordering). This 380 
difference in performance is probably due to the inclusion of practice trials in the present 381 
task. Asking a TOJ question after each practice trial presumably causes participants to focus 382 
more on the temporal order of events, so when they get to the critical clips they have a good 383 
 17 
 
idea what they should be attending to. In fact, given the long temporal interval (350 ms) 384 
between the motion of two objects and the fact that adults were expecting to be asked about 385 
the temporal order of events, it is perhaps surprising that we nevertheless still find evidence 386 
for reordering in almost half of the adults tested (in contrast, only 6% of adults responses 387 
were incorrect in the 3-object practice trials). While 9- to -10-year-olds were more likely to 388 
reorder events than adults in the 3-object pseudocollision, and more likely to report 389 
perceiving a collision between objects B and C than 7- to 9-year-olds, there was no clear 390 
developmental pattern in performance according to either of our measures.  391 
Although the data from Experiment 1 provided some initial evidence that children as 392 
young as four years reorder events in line with causal impressions, the fact that a large 393 
proportion of participants in the younger age groups gave the response that object A started 394 
moving last (41% in our youngest age group) and thus had to be excluded is unsatisfactory. 395 
This high level of exclusions makes it impossible to properly determine the developmental 396 
trajectory of the reordering phenomenon, as this hangs on how the A-responders would re-397 
distribute between B and C if they did not give the nonsensical A response. Why might 398 
participants—specifically, young children—say that A started moving last? Two features of 399 
Experiment 1 may have led children to respond in this way. First, while we deliberately 400 
avoided the use of the terms “before” and “after” given young children’s well-established 401 
difficulties with these terms, it is possible that the question “which square started moving 402 
last?” is also rather complex for young children—particularly the combination of “started” 403 
and “last”. Second, because we alternated the TOJ question between practice trials, either 404 
asking which square moved first or which square moved last, it is possible that in some cases 405 
children were expecting to be asked about which square moved first (rather than last) in the 406 
critical clip, and gave a response to that question instead (though note that if this were true we 407 
would expect the same issue to affect the 2-object control clip). In Experiment 2 we 408 
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addressed both these issues, with the aim of getting a clearer picture of the developmental 409 
trajectory of susceptibility to causal reordering. 410 
Experiment 2 411 
In Experiment 2 we again presented participants with a 3-object pseudocollision and a 412 
2-object control clip. However, to prevent participants from responding “A” in the critical 413 
TOJ question, object A was a circle, whereas B and C were both squares, and we explicitly 414 
asked about the squares (Figure 2a[ii]). Participants were introduced to the different shapes at 415 
the start of the task, and they saw a practice clip involving a circle and two squares. To 416 
address the other issues that might have contributed to the high levels of A-responding in 417 
Experiment 1, we changed the TOJ so that for all clips (practice and critical) participants 418 
were asked “Which square moved first?” We also reduced the number of practice clips from 419 
four to two, as we suspected the extensive practice phase could have contributed to the 420 
decreased prevalence of reordering in adults compared to the level reported by Bechlivanidis 421 
and Lagnado (2016). 422 
Method 423 
 Participants. Our final sample consisted of 63 adults (56 female; 3-object: N = 30, 424 
Mage = 20 years; 2-object: N = 33, Mage = 20 years) and 207 children (127 female), none of 425 
whom had participated in Experiment 1. An additional four children were tested but excluded 426 
because of a lack of attention (N = 3) or insufficient English language skills (N = 1). The 427 
child sample was divided into 3 age groups per condition: 4- to 6-year-olds (3-object: N = 33, 428 
Mage = 5 years 5 months; 2-object: N = 32, Mage = 5 years 4 months), 6- to 8-year-olds (3-429 
object: N = 33, Mage = 7 years 4 months; 2-object: N = 32, Mage = 7 years 1 month) and 8- to 430 
10-year-olds (3-object: N = 33, Mage = 9 years 8 months; 2-object: N = 32, Mage = 9 years 1 431 
month).  432 
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 Materials. The materials were the same as in Experiment 1 except that object A was a 433 
circle and we changed the colour of the shapes to blue, orange and grey, as it occurred to us 434 
that red-green colour-blindness could have been an issue in Experiment 1. 435 
 Procedure. The task instructions were the same as for Experiment 1, with the 436 
addition that before viewing the practice clips participants were introduced to the different 437 
shapes (square and circle), and children in the youngest age group were asked to name the 438 
shapes (their data were excluded if they were unable to). 439 
 Practice clips. Participants watched two non-causal practice clips (Figure 1b) in a 440 
random order and were asked the same TOJ question after each one: “Which square moved 441 
first?” 442 
 Critical clips. The 2-object control clip was identical to the clip used in Experiment 443 
1. The 3-object test clip was identical except that object A was a circle instead of a square 444 
(Figure 2a[ii]). 445 
Results 446 
Practice clips. Performance in the 2-object practice clip ranged from 71% of 447 
participants responding correctly (4- to 6-year-olds) to 87% of participants responding 448 
correctly (adults). Performance in the 3-object practice clip ranged from 66% of participants 449 
responding correctly (4- to 6-year-olds and 6- to 8-year-olds) to 90% of participants 450 
responding correctly (adults, see Table S2 for full details).  451 
Pre-registered confirmatory analyses. Across all age groups, the majority of 452 
participants responded correctly to the TOJ question (that C moved first) in the 2-object 453 
control clip (Figure 4a). In contrast to Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 there was a clear 454 
pattern of decreasing response accuracy to the TOJ question for the 3-object pseudocollision 455 
(blue bars of Figure 4a): younger children were more likely to respond correctly than older 456 
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children and adults when asked “Which square moved first?” Comparisons of TOJ responses 457 
between the 2-object and 3-object clips revealed that while 8- to 10-year-olds and adults were 458 
significantly more likely to respond correctly in the 2-object clip than the 3-object clip (chi-459 
square tests, ps ≤ 0.003, Table 1), the 4- to 6- and 6- to 8-year-olds’ performance did not 460 
differ significantly between the two critical clips (Fisher’s Exact Test, ps > 0.082). 461 
Participants in all age groups were significantly more likely to say square B collided with 462 
square C in the 3-object pseudocollision than the 2-object control clip (Figure 4b, Chi-square 463 
tests: ps ≤ 0.002 for all, Table 1). 464 
Figure 4 about here 465 
 466 
Exploratory analyses. Logistic regression revealed that participants’ tendency to 467 
report the correct order of events (TOJ question) in the pseudocollision was significantly 468 
influenced by age group (Wald χ2 = 10.52, df = 3, p = 0.015). After correcting p-values for 469 
multiple comparisons (Tukey adjustment) the youngest children were significantly more 470 
likely to respond correctly/less likely to reorder than adults (log odds ratio = 1.90, p = 0.038). 471 
There were no other significant differences between groups after adjusting for multiple 472 
comparisons (p ≥ 0.065 for all other pairs of age groups, Table S4). Participants’ tendency to 473 
report perceiving a collision between objects B and C (CJ question) in the 3-object 474 
pseudocollision was not significantly influenced by age group (Wald χ2 = 4.97, df = 3, p = 475 
0.172). These patterns of responding with age group as a categorical predictor were in 476 
keeping with analyses of child data only when age in years was included as a continuous 477 
predictor (see Table S6). TOJs and CJs were significantly associated for the 3-object 478 
pseudocollision—participants who reordered events B and C were more likely to report 479 
perceiving a collision between those objects (Phi = 0.19, p = 0.029, see Table S7 for details 480 
per age group).  481 
Discussion 482 
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Our Experiment 2 adult data closely replicates the results of Experiment 1—we again 483 
found evidence for the reordering of events in line with causality, according to both the TOJ 484 
data and the CJ data. Interestingly, reducing the number of practice clips appeared to have 485 
little impact on adults’ susceptibility to reordering (we had speculated that including fewer 486 
practice clips might lead to more adults reordering), though we did make additional task 487 
modifications that could have reduced susceptibility (e.g., asking the same TOJ question 488 
throughout; only ever asking about the squares). However, by contrast to the findings of 489 
Experiment 1, children’s TOJs in Experiment 2 suggest that it is only from around 8 years of 490 
age that reordering of events in line with causal impressions emerges (as 8- to 10-year-olds 491 
was the youngest age group in which we found a significant difference in TOJ performance 492 
between the 2-object and 3-object clips, see Table 1), and that susceptibility to this effect 493 
increases with age. Somewhat surprisingly, the two youngest groups of children (4- to 6- and 494 
6- to 8-year-olds) were equally likely to correctly report the identity of the square that moved 495 
first (C) in the 2-object and 3-object clips and were highly accurate in both cases, providing 496 
no evidence that the inclusion of object A led them to reorder events in this version of the 497 
task. Furthermore, 4- to 6-year-olds were significantly more likely to report the correct order 498 
of events in the pseudocollision than adults. 499 
The child CJ data, on the other hand, largely mirror what we found in Experiment 1—500 
all age groups were significantly more likely to incorrectly report perceiving a collision in the 501 
3-object pseudocollision than the 2-object control clip, and responses did not differ 502 
significantly across age groups. Thus, we see an intriguing difference in the pattern of 503 
performance across our two measures for the youngest children—their CJs suggest that they 504 
viewed B as bumping into C in the 3-object clip, but they do not report reordering in their 505 
TOJs. Specifically, while almost all children in the youngest group provided the correct 506 
response to the TOJ question for both clips (providing no evidence for reordering), around 507 
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60% of them incorrectly reported perceiving a collision between B and C in the 3-object clip, 508 
which suggests that the inclusion of object A did generate an impression of causality for 509 
them.  510 
The results of Experiment 2 raise two distinct questions: (1) what might explain the 511 
difference in children’s TOJ responses between Experiments 1 and 2, and (2) how can we 512 
reconcile the difference between young children’s TOJ data and CJ data in Experiment 2? We 513 
will start by addressing the first question. One possibility is that young children really do 514 
experience the correct order of events in the 3-object clip (i.e., the increasing susceptibility to 515 
reordering with age result of Experiment 2 is valid) but something about the procedure in 516 
Experiment 1 led them to give answers that misleadingly suggested they reordered the events. 517 
Alternatively, perhaps children really do reorder events in line with causality (i.e., the 518 
Experiment 1 TOJ result is valid), but something about the procedure in Experiment 2 leads 519 
them to give an answer that misleadingly suggests they did not reorder the events. Finally, it 520 
seems feasible that the results of both experiments are valid, but the modifications we made 521 
to the procedure in Experiment 2 led young children to ignore object A (circle) and focus 522 
solely on the two squares; thus they performed comparably in the 2-object and 3-object clips.  523 
To elaborate on this potential ‘ignore object A’ explanation for the Experiment 2 TOJ 524 
data: in Experiment 1 the practice trials encouraged participants to attend to the entire display 525 
because all shapes were squares, and the TOJ question differed between clips—sometimes 526 
participants were asked about which square moved first, and sometimes about which moved 527 
last. Thus, when they saw the critical clip they were likely attending to the entire display, 528 
including object A, which is presumably critical for the reordering effect to occur given that 529 
without attending to object A, the 3-object clip is identical to the 2-object control clip. During 530 
the practice trials of Experiment 2, on the other hand, participants were primed to attend only 531 
to the 2 squares (B and C), as they were only ever asked about these shapes, and furthermore 532 
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they were only ever asked which one moved first. Thus, when they saw the 3-object 533 
pseudocollision they may have completely ignored the circle and focussed their attention only 534 
on the two squares (B and C), and specifically on which one moved first (anecdotally, some 535 
children reported that they were using this strategy). 536 
If this explanation is correct, then why were younger children’s TOJs more affected 537 
by the changes to the task (and adults apparently unaffected)? One possibility is that the 538 
causal impression generated by the clip is more irresistible to older children and adults 539 
because of their more extensive experience of a variety of causal systems and, hence, stronger 540 
priors—perhaps we become less able to ‘escape’ the impression of causality as we get older 541 
(Bechlivanidis, 2015). 542 
Turning to the second question of how to reconcile the difference between young 543 
children’s TOJ data and CJ data in Experiment 2, we see two possibilities. First, perhaps 544 
young children’s CJ data, which in both experiments suggests they had a causal impression, 545 
could be explained by children glossing the test question as a question about whether there 546 
was a collision in the clip rather than interpreting it as a question about B and C. Specifically, 547 
perhaps these young children incorrectly say “yes” because they do perceive a collision 548 
(between objects A and B), but they do not actually perceive contact between objects B and 549 
C. (We note that one difficulty with this interpretation is that it seems inconsistent with the 550 
‘ignore A’ explanation of the young children’s TOJ data, because it suggests that children 551 
paid sufficient attention to A to perceive it making contact with B). The second possibility is 552 
that both TOJ and CJ data are valid in Experiment 2, i.e., there is a genuine difference 553 
between how collision perception and temporal order perception are affected by the causality 554 
manipulation in the youngest group. That is, perhaps in this youngest group, participants have 555 
the impression that B collided with C, but their temporal order judgements are not affected by 556 
the causality manipulation in the way that older participants’ judgements are.  557 
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In Experiment 3 we attempted to reduce the likelihood of participants engaging in an 558 
‘ignore A’ strategy by presenting a series of practice clips that encouraged them to attend to 559 
all three shapes. If only attending to objects B and C was driving the pattern of TOJ responses 560 
in Experiment 2, then young children should revert to reordering (replicating the results of 561 
Experiment 1). If on the other hand younger children really are less susceptible to causal 562 
reordering then we should replicate the results of Experiment 2. 563 
Experiment 3 564 
The critical clips and questions that followed were the same as in Experiment 2 565 
(Figure 2a[ii] and 2b). However, to encourage participants to attend to all of the shapes 566 
(which may not have been the case in Experiment 2 and could explain the lack of reordering 567 
in young children compared to in Experiment 1) we made some changes to the practice clips. 568 
Specifically, we aimed to create a situation in which, by the time the critical clips were 569 
viewed, participants did not know which shape they would be asked about. We did this by 570 
varying which object we asked about between practice trials: on some trials we asked which 571 
shape moved first, and in others we asked which circle moved first. Then, on the critical 572 
trials we asked which square moved first (Figure 1c). 573 
Method 574 
 Participants. Our final sample consisted of 54 adults (40 female, 3-object: N = 28, 575 
Mage = 19 years; 2-object: N = 26, Mage = 19 years) and 197 children (119 female), none of 576 
whom had participated in Experiments 1—2. An additional two children were tested but 577 
excluded because they were inattentive (N=1), or because they repeatedly responded “don’t 578 
know” to the questions (N=1). The child sample was divided into 3 age groups per condition: 579 
4- to 6-year-olds (3-object: N = 34, Mage = 5 years 1 month; 2-object: N = 32, Mage = 5 years 580 
5 months), 6- to 8-year-olds (3-object: N = 34, Mage = 7 years 1 month; 2-object: N = 31, Mage 581 
 25 
 
= 7 years 0 months) and 8- to 10-year-olds (3-object: N = 34, Mage = 9 years 7 months; 2-582 
object: N = 31, Mage = 9 years 1 month). 583 
 Materials. The materials were the same as in Experiments 1 and 2 but we again 584 
changed the colours of the shapes to red, blue and yellow (because a few of the youngest 585 
children were unsure of the colour grey in Experiment 2). 586 
 Procedure. Participants saw three non-causal practice clips (Figure 1 c): two clips 587 
with one square and one circle, and one clip with two circles and a square. After the 2-object 588 
practice clips participants were asked “which shape moved first?” and the correct answer was 589 
the circle for one clip, and the square for the other clip. After the 3-object practice clip 590 
participants were asked “which circle moved first?” The critical clips (2-object control clip 591 
and 3-object pseudocollision) were the same as in Experiment 2 (Figure 2a[ii] and 2b). 592 
Results 593 
Practice clips. Performance in the 2-object practice clips ranged from 76% of 594 
participants responding correctly (4- to 6-year-olds) to 95% of participants responding 595 
correctly (adults). Performance in the 3-object practice clip ranged from 55% of participants 596 
responding correctly (4- to 6-year-olds) to 94% of participants responding correctly (adults, 597 
see Table S2 for full details). 598 
Pre-registered confirmatory analyses. Across all age groups, the majority of 599 
participants responded correctly to the TOJ question (that C moved first) in the 2-object 600 
control clip (Figure 5a). As in Experiment 2, there was a pattern of decreasing response 601 
accuracy in the TOJ question for the 3-object pseudocollision (blue bars of Figure 5a): 602 
younger children were again more likely to respond correctly than older children and adults 603 
when asked “Which square moved first?” Comparisons of TOJ responses between the 2-604 
object and 3-object clips revealed that while 6- to 8-year-olds, 8- to 10-year-olds and adults 605 
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were significantly more likely to respond correctly in the 2-object clip (Chi square tests, ps ≤ 606 
0.002, Table 1), the 4- to 6-year-olds’ performance did not differ significantly between the 607 
two critical clips (Fisher’s Exact Test, p = 0.108, Table 1). As in Experiments 1 and 2, 608 
participants in all age groups were significantly more likely to say square B collided with 609 
square C in the 3-object pseudocollision than the 2-object control clip (Figure 5b, Chi-square 610 
tests: ps ≤ 0.017 for all, Table 1). 611 
Figure 5 about here 612 
Exploratory analyses. Logistic regression revealed that participants’ tendency to 613 
report the correct order of events (TOJ question) in the pseudocollision was significantly 614 
influenced by age group (Wald χ2 = 11.32, df = 3, p = 0.010). Posthoc contrasts with Tukey 615 
adjusted p-values for multiple comparisons revealed a significant difference between 4- to 6-616 
year-olds and 8- to 10-year-olds (log odds ratio = 1.69, p = 0.015), with the youngest children 617 
being more likely to respond correctly/less likely to reorder than the oldest children. There 618 
were no other significant differences between groups after adjusting for multiple comparisons 619 
(ps ≥ 0.124 for all other pairs of age groups, Table S5). Participants’ tendency to report 620 
perceiving a collision between objects B and C (CJ question) in the 3-object pseudocollision 621 
was not significantly influenced by age group (Wald χ2 = 1.20, df = 3, p = 0.754). These 622 
patterns of responding with age group as a categorical predictor were in keeping with 623 
analyses of child data only when age in years was included as a continuous predictor (see 624 
Table S6). TOJs and CJs were significantly associated for the 3-object pseudocollision—625 
participants who reordered events B and C were more likely to report perceiving a collision 626 
between those objects (Phi = 0.23, p = 0.010, see Table S7 for details per age group).  627 
Discussion 628 
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In Experiment 3, we once again replicated our adult results. Thus, while including 629 
practice clips (and potentially simplifying the response measures) reduces susceptibility to 630 
causal reordering compared with in a ‘one-shot’ experiment where participants only see the 631 
critical clip, it seems that the number and nature of the practice clips does not influence 632 
adults’ performance. Even using our simplified paradigm, around 40% of adults reorder the 633 
events, and 40-60% incorrectly report perceiving contact between objects B and C. 634 
The child data from Experiment 3 is largely comparable to that obtained in 635 
Experiment 2—TOJ accuracy for the 3-object pseudocollision decreases with age (8- to -10-636 
year-olds were significantly less accurate than 4- to 6-year-olds), and once again there is a 637 
discrepancy between the youngest children’s TOJ responses and their CJ responses. Thus, we 638 
did not find any evidence that encouraging young children to attend to all of the objects in the 639 
display made them more likely to reorder events in line with causality. It is therefore 640 
tempting to conclude that young children really are less susceptible to causal reordering than 641 
older children and adults. This conclusion, though, still leaves us to explain why the youngest 642 
children’s CJ responses resembled those of adults—there was no significant difference 643 
between age groups for the pseudocollision CJ responses. As we pointed out above, there are 644 
two possible reasons for this: i) either it is the case that these children’s CJ data is explained 645 
by a tendency to interpret the test question as being about whether there was a collision (as 646 
opposed to where the collision occurred) or, ii) more radically, children’s perception of 647 
collision are affected by the causality manipulation but their temporal order judgements are 648 
not.  649 
However, a further possible explanation for the observed data remains, which was 650 
raised by some anecdotal observations while running Experiment 3 with the younger 651 
children. First, a handful of children spontaneously gave a response to the TOJ question for 652 
the 3-object pseudocollision (responding that square C moved first) before the experimenter 653 
 28 
 
had asked the question. This was despite the fact that, based on the practice trials, the 654 
experimenter might feasibly have asked “which shape moved first?”, or “which circle moved 655 
first?” to which the correct answer would have been object A/the circle in both cases. This 656 
suggests that these participants may have been responding to something other than the 657 
question being asked. Second, one 4-year-old correctly gave the response ‘C’, and then 658 
spontaneously said “because it’s in the lead!” This raises the possibility that some children, 659 
rather than reporting the motion onset, may be reporting the final spatial position of the 660 
objects, taking into account the direction of movement, and this misinterpretation may be 661 
more common for younger children. That is, when asked “Which square moved first?” they 662 
respond to the question “Which came first”, or which went furthest to the right (if motion 663 
direction is left-to-right), which is object C. In addition, spontaneous verbalizations by some 664 
children also suggested that the TOJ question was being misinterpreted—for example, some 665 
children responded that C moved first, but then went on to describe events along the lines of 666 
“A moved and hit B, and then that moved and hit C”, which was incompatible with the TOJ 667 
response they gave. Finally, it seems unlikely that 4- to 6-year-olds would only respond 668 
correctly 52% of the time in the 3-object practice trial, but 83% of the time in the 3-object 669 
pseudocollision given that the two clips were similar in terms of their complexity (they both 670 
involved three objects, and the relative motion onsets of the objects were identical in the two 671 
clip types). 672 
If some children are inappropriately responding in this way (i.e., giving their answer 673 
on the basis of spatial position on the screen rather reporting temporal order), this could also 674 
explain the high levels of A-responding in Experiment 1. Recall that around 40% of the 675 
youngest age group gave the response “A” when asked “Which square started moving last?” 676 
This seemed baffling as square A was quite clearly the first object to move, but makes sense 677 
if some children are responding on the basis of the objects’ final positions (considering 678 
 29 
 
direction of movement), as outlined above. Under this account, object A “came last”—it 679 
finished spatially “behind” squares B and C. If we assume a similar proportion of the 680 
youngest children also responded along these lines in Experiments 2 and 3, that would 681 
explain a large chunk of the C-responses (because C “won/came first”), which in these two 682 
experiments happened to correspond to the correct answer about which object moved first. A 683 
reduction in the proportion of children responding on this “winner/loser” basis across age 684 
groups could explain the apparent developmental pattern of younger children appearing to 685 
give more accurate TOJs in the 3-object pseudocollision than we observed in Experiments 2 686 
and 3. This account could also explain the differential way in which the causality 687 
manipulation affected TOJs and CJs—if the aforementioned hypothesis is correct (i.e., some 688 
proportion of young children are responding on the basis of which object came first/last), 689 
then it seems likely that the CJ data are valid, and younger children’s TOJ data are being 690 
influenced by the nature of the TOJ question being asked and do not reflect their actual 691 
perception of temporal order. 692 
Experiment 4 693 
In Experiment 4 we replicated Experiment 3, but replaced the 2-object control clip 694 
with a 3-object canonical collision where A was a circle and B and C were squares (just like 695 
the pseudocollisions in Experiments 2 and 3), so the veridical order of motion was ABC. As 696 
in Experiments 2 and 3, we asked participants “which square moved first?” If younger 697 
children are making a genuine TOJ, and are as accurate as they appear to be in Experiments 2 698 
and 3, then in the canonical clip they should respond “B”. If they still respond “C” then this 699 
will provide support for the “winner/loser” spatially-based response outlined above.  700 
To address whether the CJ results in the previous experiments might be explained by 701 
a tendency to respond “yes” when asked about the 3-object pseudocollision because of the 702 
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presence of a collision between objects A and B, instead of only asking whether square B 703 
bumped into square C, for the critical clips we asked about all pairs of squares in a random 704 
order (i.e., Did A bump into B? Did B bump into C? Did A bump into C?). If participants are 705 
responding to this question in the way it is intended, for both critical clips participants should 706 
respond “yes” for A-B and “no” for A-C. They should also respond “yes” when asked about 707 
B-C in the canonical collision; if they also respond “yes” in the pseudocollision then this will 708 
provide evidence that participants do indeed perceive the movement of C as caused by B. 709 
Method 710 
 Participants. Our final sample consisted of 127 children (65 female); 65 4- to 6-year-711 
olds, none of whom had participated in Experiments 1—3 (pseudocollision: N = 35, Mage = 5 712 
years 10 months; canonical collision: N = 30, Mage = 6 years 1 month) and 62 8- to 10-year-713 
olds (pseudocollision: N = 32, Mage = 8 years 10 months; canonical collision: N = 30, Mage = 714 
8 years 9 months). An additional 4 children were tested but excluded because they were 715 
inattentive (N=2), because they could not name the shapes (N=1), or because of experimenter 716 
error (N=1).  717 
 Procedure. The practice clips were the same as for Experiment 3 (Figure 1c). The 718 
critical clips consisted of the 3-object pseudocollision (ACB, Figure 2a[ii]) from Experiments 719 
2 and 3, and a 3-object canonical collision (ABC, Figure 2c). In the canonical collision, 720 
object A moved towards object B and stopped adjacent to it, following which B started 721 
moving towards object C. B stopped adjacent to C, and C started moving away from B. As 722 
for the pseudocollision, all objects moved at a speed of 30 mm/s. 723 
 Results.  724 
Practice clips. Performance in the 2-object practice clips was 72% correct responses 725 
for 4- to 6-year-olds and 92% correct responses for 8- to 10-year-olds. Performance in the 3-726 
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object practice clip was 58% correct responses for 4- to 6-year-olds and 84% correct 727 
responses for 8- to 10-year-olds (see Table S1 for full details). 728 
Pre-registered confirmatory analyses. Four- to six-year-olds’ TOJs were 729 
significantly less accurate for the canonical collision where the correct response was ‘B’ 730 
(23% correct), than for the reordered pseudocollision where the correct response was ‘C’ 731 
(80% correct, χ2 = 20.87, p < 0.001); in fact, they were equally likely to say that C moved 732 
first for the pseudocollision and the canonical clip (Figure 6). The 8- to 10-year-olds on the 733 
other hand mostly gave the (correct) response that B moved first in the canonical clip, though 734 
30% of participants in this age group still erroneously claimed that C moved first in the 735 
canonical clip (Figure 6). The older children were more likely to respond correctly in the 736 
canonical clip than in the pseudocollision, but not significantly so (canonical collision: 70% 737 
correct, pseudocollision: 59% correct, χ2 = 0.76, p = 0.382). 738 
Figure 6 about here 739 
Participants in both age groups were significantly more likely so respond ‘yes’ when asked 740 
whether A bumped into B (which it did) compared with when asked whether A bumped into 741 
C (which it did not), and this was true for both clip types (canonical and reordered, ps < 742 
0.001 for all, Figure 7). 743 
Figure 7 about here 744 
In both age groups and for both types of clip the majority of participants (>80%) responded 745 
‘yes’ when asked whether B bumped into C (Figure 7). There was no significant difference 746 
between the responses children in either age group gave for the canonical collision and the 747 
reordered collision when asked whether square B bumped into square C (4- to 6-year-olds: χ2 748 
= 0.03, p = 0.959; 8- to 10-year-olds: χ2 = 0.336, p = 0.562). 749 
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Exploratory analyses. TOJs and CJs were significantly associated for the 3-object 750 
pseudocollision—participants who reordered events B and C were more likely to report 751 
perceiving a collision between those objects (Phi = 0.31, p = 0.013, see Table S2 for details 752 
per age group).  753 
Discussion 754 
Experiment 4 again replicated the developmental pattern of TOJ responses from 755 
Experiments 2 and 3, with younger children appearing to give more accurate TOJs (saying C 756 
moved first) than older children for the reordered pseudocollision clip. However, the results 757 
for the canonical collision strongly suggest that this does not reflect a better ability to 758 
perceive the veridical order of events in early childhood. When shown a canonical collision, 759 
older children gave more accurate TOJs than younger children. Specifically, the majority of 760 
children in the younger age group responded incorrectly to the TOJ question when presented 761 
with a canonical collision where the correct answer was ‘B’, which strongly suggests that 762 
they tend to give the response ‘C’ regardless of clip type. Eight- to 10-year-olds on the other 763 
hand mostly gave the correct response ‘B’ for the canonical collision, though almost 1/3 still 764 
responded ‘C’, suggesting that the TOJ question may also cause problems for some older 765 
children. Thus it appears that the majority of young children and some older children may not 766 
be interpreting the TOJ question (“which square moved first?”) as it was intended; instead 767 
they appear to respond on the basis of which square ‘came first’, choosing a square on the 768 
basis of spatial position. Furthermore, as in the previous experiments we did not find the 769 
expected association between TOJs and CJs for the youngest group of children. 770 
 In addition to asking whether square B bumped into square C as in Experiments 1–3, 771 
in Experiment 4 we also asked participants for their collision judgements about the other 772 
pairs of shapes. This enabled us to establish that children of all of the ages tested do indeed 773 
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understand the collision question and interpret it correctly (i.e., they are able to correctly 774 
identify the presence/absence of a ‘bump’ between object pairs) – they typically say ‘yes’ 775 
when asked whether A bumped into B, and ‘no’ when asked whether A bumped into C. 776 
Interestingly, > 80 % of participants in both age groups reported (incorrectly) that B did 777 
bump into C in the pseudocollision. Given that a comparable percentage of participants gave 778 
this response for the canonical collision, this provides strong evidence that the causal 779 
impression generated by the pseudocollision is similar to that generated by the canonical 780 
collision. 781 
General Discussion 782 
Across four experiments we investigated whether children, like adults, reorder events 783 
in line with causality. We modified an existing adult paradigm (Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 784 
2016) for this purpose: in each experiment participants watched a 3-object pseudocollision in 785 
which the order of events was manipulated so that, unlike in a canonical collision, the third 786 
object in line (C) moved before the middle object (B) (i.e., the order of motion onset was 787 
ACB, and object B never collided with object C). They were then asked (a) a temporal order 788 
judgement (TOJ) question and (b) a collision judgement (CJ) question (three in Experiment 789 
4). If participants reorder events in line with causality, then they should incorrectly report that 790 
B moved before C. If the introduction of A affects whether they perceive a collision between 791 
B and C, they should also incorrectly report that B bumped into C.  792 
Overall, we found evidence that the causality manipulation affected children’s 793 
perception of the order of events in the sequence. Across all four experiments participants in 794 
all age groups (including adults) were significantly more likely to report perceiving a 795 
collision between objects B and C in the 3-object pseudocollision than in the 2-object control 796 
clip, despite the spatiotemporal relations between B and C being identical in the two clips. 797 
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Furthermore, CJs did not differ significantly between age groups (apart from in Experiment 798 
1, where 9- to 10-year-olds were more likely to report a collision than 7- to 9-year-olds). We 799 
also found evidence for reordering according to our TOJ measure in the majority of age 800 
groups: from 4 years in Experiment 1, from 8 years in Experiment 2, and from 6 years in 801 
Experiment 3. However, our two measures were not consistently associated with one another 802 
(see supplementary Table S7) and the TOJ data from the younger children showed an 803 
interesting pattern of results that warrants further discussion.  804 
Although TOJ responses in Experiment 1 provided evidence for reordering in all age 805 
groups, taken at face value the subsequent TOJ results from Experiments 2 and 3 suggested 806 
that younger children did not reorder events, and may in fact have been more accurate than 807 
older children and adults in their perception of the order of events. However, Experiment 4 808 
demonstrated that some children—particularly in the younger age range—had a systematic 809 
tendency to respond based on spatial rather than temporal information when asked “Which 810 
square moved first?” Specifically, when shown a canonical collision where the order of 811 
motion onset was ABC, the majority of young children still reported that C moved first (i.e., 812 
before B). Thus, it appears that some children respond on the basis of which square ‘came 813 
first’, rather than which started to move first. This basis for responding can also explain the 814 
large proportion of young children saying that object A started moving last in Experiment 815 
1—in this case, A ‘came last’.  816 
Despite deliberately avoiding use of the terms ‘before’ or ‘after’ in our TOJ questions, 817 
our results demonstrate that, at least under these circumstances, asking which object moved 818 
first/last is also not an appropriate measure of very young children’s temporal order 819 
perception in this context (i.e., when there is a possible spatial interpretation of the question). 820 
The general idea that young children are likely to (erroneously) focus on spatial rather than 821 
temporal cues has a long history within developmental psychology (Piaget, 1969; see 822 
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McCormack, 2015, for historical review). The current findings add to the body of evidence 823 
that suggests that young children may privilege spatial information, perhaps because of the 824 
more concrete nature of spatial cues (Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2007; Casasanto, 825 
Fotakopoulou, & Boroditsky, 2010). 826 
However, Experiment 4 also confirmed that young children’s collision judgements 827 
were valid: following the canonical clip, they were able to accurately identify the presence 828 
(between A and B) and absence (between A and C) of a ‘bump’ between objects. Taken 829 
together with the CJ results for Experiments 1-3, this suggests that the inclusion of object A 830 
generates a causal impression that modulates children’s experience of the subsequent motion 831 
of B and C. In Experiment 4, children in both age groups were equally likely to report 832 
perceiving a collision between B and C in the pseudocollision (where there was no collision 833 
between these objects) and in a 3-object canonical collision (where there actually was a 834 
collision between B and C). This suggests that for 4- to 10-year-olds, as for adults, the 835 
pseudocollision generates the same impression of causality as a genuine collision.  836 
What then should we conclude about the developmental profile of the reordering 837 
effect? Setting aside the data from the youngest age group (4- to 6-year-olds), there was no 838 
evidence across Experiments 1—3 that susceptibility to the causal reordering effect increases 839 
with age. This suggests that causal reordering is present in children, as it is in adults, and that 840 
it remains stable over development. The key issue is whether we should conclude that this 841 
effect is also present in early childhood, in 4- to 6-year-olds. As we have pointed out, across 842 
four experiments the CJ data from this age group consistently suggested that they are as 843 
likely as older children and adults to mistakenly report that B collided with C in the 3-object 844 
clip. The data from Experiment 4 indicate that there is no reason to assume that the causality 845 
manipulation genuinely had a differential effect on young children’s collision perception and 846 
their temporal order perception; rather, their temporal order judgements were unreliable. The 847 
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4- to 6-year-olds’ performance in the 3-object practice clips—where it was not possible to 848 
respond on the basis of a spatial strategy—were poor compared with other age groups, 849 
suggesting that children in this age group may have difficulties tracking and remembering the 850 
order of motion onset of three objects. Thus, the most conservative conclusion is that we do 851 
not yet know whether 4- to 6-year-olds show the causal reordering effect. However, taken 852 
alongside children’s CJ data, we believe that the findings of Experiment 1 provide a good 853 
reason for believing that causal reordering is indeed evident in this age group. Unlike in 854 
Experiments 2—4, we can exclude children in Experiment 1 who responded to the TOJ 855 
question on the basis of spatial position: these are the children who reported that A started 856 
moving last. Indeed, our existing analysis excluded these children (based on our pre-857 
registered confirmatory analysis plan), and a substantial majority of the remaining children in 858 
this group (76%) reported that C was the last object to move in the 3-object pseudocollision 859 
clip (but not in the 2-object clip). Thus, the findings of Experiment 1 suggest that causal 860 
reordering is present even in 4- to 6-year-olds.    861 
 In sum, we believe that our findings provide evidence for an early-developing role of 862 
causality in interpreting the environment. While infants’ causal perception has previously 863 
been shown to be influenced by bottom-up visual factors in a comparable way to adults’ (e.g., 864 
the grouping effect, Choi & Scholl, 2004; Newman et al., 2008), the present study 865 
demonstrates that children’s causal perception can also exert top-down effects on their 866 
temporal perception, as is the case for adults (Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 2016). This evidence 867 
that causality can influence children’s experience of time is in keeping with recent research 868 
showing that children as young as four years are susceptible to temporal binding—with 869 
children predicting that events will occur earlier if they are causally connected to a preceding 870 
event, compared to when it is preceded by an arbitrary predictive signal (Blakey et al., 2018). 871 
Thus, it appears that not only do children use temporal cues to make causal judgements (e.g., 872 
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Bullock & Gelman, 1979; McCormack et al., 2015; Mendelson & Shultz, 1976; Rankin & 873 
McCormack, 2013; Schlottmann et al., 1999); they also use causal cues to make temporal 874 
judgements—about the duration between events, and about the order in which events 875 
occurred.  876 
Although the results presented in the current study are illuminating with respect to the 877 
developmental trajectory of causal reordering, important questions remain regarding the 878 
mechanism underpinning the effect. Properly answering these questions is beyond the scope 879 
of the present study, and will require developing new paradigms to distinguish between 880 
possible explanations of the reordering effect. Nevertheless, in what follows we outline these 881 
different potential explanations, discuss what has been established to date, and describe our 882 
ongoing work with adults that aims to generate new evidence to definitively distinguish 883 
between these alternative explanations.  884 
There are three distinct types of explanation that might account for the reordering 885 
effect, which are set out by Bechlivanidis and Lagnado (2016). First, it is possible that when 886 
viewing the 3-object pseudocollision participants fail to see all of the events and so they do 887 
not actually perceive their order (inattention). Specifically, it is plausible that the motion of 888 
object B could be missed, as attention is diverted by the motion onset of object C. On such an 889 
explanation, reordering occurs because participants ‘fill in’ the missing information by 890 
making a post hoc inference on the basis of the most likely order of events, given their causal 891 
impression. Arguably this is the least interesting explanation of the effect, because it suggests 892 
that participants simply speculate about what might have happened, rather than their 893 
judgments being based on processing the events that they were presented with. Second, the 894 
reordering effect could occur if participants do attend to and accurately perceive the order of 895 
all events, but because of the causal impression generated by the clip, the memory of events 896 
they ultimately retrieve is of the more plausible causal order (misremembering). Finally, it 897 
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may be the case that participants’ original representation of the temporal order of events 898 
matches the causal order rather than the objective order—i.e., they actually perceive events 899 
happening in an order that does not reflect reality (misperceiving). This last possibility is 900 
particularly interesting, because it challenges what might be seen as the intuitive view of 901 
perception, namely that events are perceived in the order in which they occur, so that the 902 
temporal structure of experience simply mirrors the temporal structure of events in the world 903 
(Hoerl, 2013; Phillips, 2014). 904 
Previous findings with adults speak against the inattention account of reordering (that 905 
participants do not attend to all of the objects in the pseudocollision). When participants first 906 
watch a pseudocollision, and are subsequently presented with a pseudocollison and a 907 
canonical collision side by side, they tend to mistake the pseudocollision they initially saw 908 
for the canonical collision. In contrast, when they are first presented with a slightly modified 909 
pseudocollision clip in which B does not move at all, this is detected by most people and they 910 
are able to identify it as the clip they saw, rather than mistaking it for a canonical collision 911 
(Experiment 2, Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 2016). This suggests that participants apparently 912 
do attend to the behaviour of object B—they are not simply filling in missing information 913 
post hoc because they did not see what happened. However, this study could not distinguish 914 
between ‘misremembering’ and ‘misperceiving’ accounts of the reordering effect. 915 
Distinguishing between these two accounts is difficult because in the studies to date 916 
participants have made their judgments after the events have happened. Ideally, in order to 917 
examine what participants perceive (rather than what they construct in memory), a paradigm 918 
would be used that taps into the processes that occur while the events themselves unfold. 919 
However, given the very short time scales over which the events happen, such a paradigm 920 
could not involve participants making explicit verbal judgments, as such judgments are by 921 
necessity post-hoc. We are currently testing a paradigm with adults that we believe taps into 922 
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the processes that occur as the events unfold, in which participants have to synchronize the 923 
occurrence of another unrelated event with the onset of movement of B or C. In this task, 924 
participants are given multiple opportunities to view the pseudocollision and adjust the timing 925 
of the unrelated event so that they perceive it as occurring simultaneously either with the 926 
movement of B or the movement of C. If causal reordering stems from a genuine perceptual 927 
effect (participants perceive B moving before C), then the temporal location of events should 928 
be shifted to match causal assumptions—when synching with B, participants should place the 929 
unrelated event earlier than the actual onset of B’s motion, and when synching with C they 930 
should place the unrelated event later than the actual onset of motion. If instead participants 931 
accurately perceive the order of events (they perceive C moving before B) and it is only later 932 
that their causal impression interferes with their temporal order judgement, then their 933 
placements of the unrelated event should reflect the veridical timing of B’s and C’s motion 934 
onset.  935 
Depending on our adult findings, we hope to subsequently explore whether this task 936 
can also be adapted for use with children, although the task is likely to be more challenging 937 
than the one used in the current study because of the need for multiple trials in which 938 
millisecond timing adjustments are made (though see Blakey et al., 2018). We should 939 
emphasize, though, that in our view the developmental profile of the reordering effect is 940 
interesting regardless of whether a misremembering or misperceiving explanation of it is 941 
correct. This is because, regardless of which of these explanations is correct, reordering 942 
serves as a novel demonstration of how causal assumptions have top-down effects on basic 943 
processes. Establishing whether such assumptions play a similar role in children sheds light 944 
on the extent to which causal cognition plays a similar fundamental role from early in 945 
development.  946 
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Thus, the current findings are informative with regards to children’s causal reasoning 947 
abilities more broadly. First, our results add to the small body of work suggesting that 948 
children’s perception of physical causation is largely similar to that of adults (Schlottmann, 949 
Allan, et al., 2002; Schlottmann, Cole, et al., 2013). Previous research has used simple two-950 
object displays and indicated that the introduction of delays or spatial gaps reduces the 951 
likelihood that children perceive physical causation (Schlottmann et al., 2013); in this respect 952 
children largely resemble adults. However, the pseudocollision presented to children in the 953 
present study apparently generated a causal impression (as participants reported that B 954 
bumped into C), even though no contact was made and C moved before B. As with adult 955 
findings (Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 2016), these results suggest that, rather than causal 956 
impressions being determined only by the basic spatial-temporal properties of object 957 
movement, schemata—in this case, a series of collisions—are used in a top-down manner in 958 
the interpretation of perceptual displays. Such schemata appear to be used in the same way in 959 
young children as in adults. Second, a large body of previous work has demonstrated that 960 
young children are able to use the causal structure of events in the world to make inferences 961 
and guide their behaviour (e.g., Muentener & Schulz, 2016; Sobel & Legare, 2014). Causal 962 
reasoning has been proposed to play an important role in diverse domains, including 963 
children’s understanding of the physical world (e.g., Baillargeon, 2004), the development of 964 
morality (e.g., Hamlin, 2013), and the generation of explanations (e.g., Legare, 2012). The 965 
present study extends the evidence on the influence of causality on children’s experience of 966 
the world to another domain: their experience of time. Thus, the current results add to a 967 
growing body of evidence that causality plays a fundamental role in our experience of the 968 
world from early in development. 969 
On the assumption that the present study has demonstrated that children as young as 970 
four years reorder events to match a causal interpretation, further work is needed to establish 971 
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the developmental origins of this temporal illusion. For example, a habituation paradigm 972 
could be used to test whether or not infants discriminate between a canonical 3-object 973 
collision and the reordered pseuodocollision. There would also be value in developing a 974 
paradigm appropriate for comparative studies to enable investigation of the evolutionary 975 
origins of causal reordering. While ‘higher’ causal knowledge and inference has been 976 
reasonably widely explored in non-human animals (e.g., Seed & Call, 2009), there have been 977 
relatively few studies of causal perception. Recent research has demonstrated that 978 
chimpanzees are susceptible to causal capture, in which a causal impression can induce 979 
perceptual alteration of the spatiotemporal properties of co-occurring events (Matsuno & 980 
Tomonaga, 2017; Scholl & Nakamaya, 2002). This provides initial evidence that causality 981 
also influences the visual perception of our closest ape relatives, but just how 982 
phylogenetically widespread susceptibility to causality-based temporal illusions might be 983 
remains an open question. 984 
To conclude, the findings reported in the present study add to a small but growing 985 
body of evidence demonstrating an early-developing bidirectional relation between time and 986 
causality (Blakey et al., 2018; Lorimer et al., 2017). The current study extends this research 987 
by showing that children’s causal impressions can qualitatively alter their temporal 988 
experience—through the reordering of events to match a causal interpretation. 989 
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Table 1. Summary of results comparing performance in the 2-object control clip and the 3-1128 
object pseudocollision for all age groups in Experiments 1—3 for the temporal order judgement 1129 
(TOJ) and collision judgement (CJ) measures.  1130 
   Age Group   
 Measure 4 to 6 6 to 7 7 to 9 9 to 10 Adult 
Exp. 1 TOJ χ2 = 29.89 
p < 0.001 
χ2 = 32.61 
p < 0.001 
χ2 = 28.13 
p < 0.001 
χ2 = 40.24 
p < 0.001 
χ2 = 15.99 
p < 0.001 
 CJ χ2 = 10.56 
p = 0.001 
χ2 = 15.59 
p < 0.001 
χ2 = 17.21 
p < 0.001 
χ2 = 32.94 
p < 0.001 
χ2 = 18.28 
p < 0.001 
   Age Group   
 Measure 4 to 6 6 to 8 8 to 10  Adults 
Exp. 2 TOJ  
p = 0.238 a 
 
p = 0.082 a 
χ2 = 8.72 
p = 0.003 
 χ2 = 16.31 
p < 0.001 
 CJ χ2 = 13.89 
p < 0.001 
χ2 = 9.67 
p = 0.002 
χ2 = 7.33 
p = 0.007 
 χ2 = 13.12 
p < 0.001 
Exp. 3 TOJ  
p = 0.108 a 
 
p = 0.002a 
χ2 = 22.70 
p < 0.001 
 χ2 = 12.83 
p < 0.001 
 CJ χ2 = 5.73  
p = 0.017 
χ2 = 22.71 
p < 0.001 
χ2 = 20.75 
p < 0.001 
 χ2 = 14.84 
p < 0.001 
a Fisher’s Exact Test 1131 
 1132 
 1133 
 1134 
 1135 
 1136 
 1137 
 1138 
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 1139 
Figure 1. Schematic representations of example practice clips seen by participants in (a) 1140 
Experiment 1, (b) Experiment 2 and (c) Experiments 3 and 4, and the TOJ question they were 1141 
asked after each clip. Direction of motion shown is left-to-right, but could also be right-to-left. 1142 
The colours of the objects were randomized between participants. Clips were presented in a 1143 
random order. In Experiment 1 participants saw two clips of each type (3-object and 2-object; 1144 
4 in total) and motion onset order of the shapes was random. They were either asked about 1145 
which square started moving last or first, with the order alternating between clips. In 1146 
Experiment 2 participants saw one clip of each type and the circle always moved first in the 3-1147 
object clip. In Experiments 3 and 4 participants saw one 3-object clip where the square always 1148 
moved first, and two 2-object clips: one where the circle moved first and one where the square 1149 
moved first (not shown). 1150 
 1151 
 1152 
 1153 
 1154 
 1155 
 1156 
 1157 
 50 
 
 1158 
Figure 2. Schematic representations of (a) the 3-object pseudocollision clip used in [i] 1159 
Experiment 1 and [ii] Experiments 2—4; (b) the 2-object control clip used in Experiments 1—1160 
3; and (c) the 3-object canonical collision used in Experiment 4, and the TOJ and CJ questions 1161 
participants were asked after each clip. Direction of motion shown is left-to-right, but could 1162 
also be right-to-left. The colours of the objects were randomised between participants. In 1163 
Experiment 2 the colours used were orange, blue and grey (not shown). In Experiment 4, 1164 
participants were asked a CJ question about each pair of shapes (in a random order) for the 1165 
pseudocollision and the canonical collision, so for the example shown for the latter they would 1166 
also have been asked whether the yellow circle bumped into the red square, and whether the 1167 
yellow circle bumped into the blue square. 1168 
 1169 
 1170 
 1171 
 1172 
 1173 
 1174 
 1175 
 1176 
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    (a) Exp. 1 Temporal order judgements   (b) Exp. 1 Collision judgements 1177 
 1178 
       1179 
Figure 3. Percentage of participants in each age group who gave the correct response in (a) 1180 
the temporal order judgement question (square B); and (b) the collision judgement question 1181 
(no), in the 2-object control clip (red bars/left-hand bar for each age group) and 3-object 1182 
pseudocollision (blue bars/right-hand bar for each age group) of Experiment 1. 1183 
 1184 
 1185 
 1186 
 1187 
 1188 
 1189 
 1190 
 1191 
 1192 
 1193 
 1194 
 1195 
 1196 
 1197 
 1198 
 1199 
 1200 
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     (a) Exp. 2 Temporal order judgements   (b) Exp. 2 Collision judgements 1201 
 1202 
         1203 
 1204 
Figure 4. Percentage of participants in each age group who gave the correct response in (a) 1205 
the temporal order judgement question (square C); and (b) the collision judgement question 1206 
(no) in the 2-object control clip (red bars/left-hand bar for each age group) and 3-object 1207 
pseudocollision (blue bars/right-hand bar per age group) of Experiment 2. 1208 
 1209 
 1210 
 1211 
 1212 
 1213 
 1214 
 1215 
 1216 
 1217 
 1218 
 1219 
 1220 
 1221 
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     (a) Exp. 3 Temporal order judgements   (b) Exp. 3 Collision judgements 1222 
 1223 
         1224 
 1225 
Figure 5. Percentage of participants in each age group who gave the correct response in (a) the 1226 
temporal order judgement question (square C); and (b) the collision judgement question (no) 1227 
in the 2-object control clip (red bars/left-hand bar for each age group) and 3-object 1228 
pseudocollision (blue bars/right-hand bar for each age group) of Experiment 3. 1229 
 1230 
 1231 
 1232 
 1233 
 1234 
 1235 
 1236 
 1237 
 1238 
 1239 
 1240 
 1241 
 1242 
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 1243 
Figure 6. Percentage of participants in each age group of Experiment 4 who gave the correct 1244 
response for the temporal order judgement question for the canonical collision (red bars/left-1245 
hand bar for each age group, correct answer was B) and the reordered collision (blue bars/right-1246 
hand bar for each age group, correct answer was C). 1247 
 1248 
 1249 
 1250 
 1251 
 1252 
 1253 
 1254 
 1255 
 1256 
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 1257 
Figure 7. Percentage of participants in each age group who responded ‘yes’ to each of the three 1258 
causal impression questions for the canonical collision (red bars/left-hand bar for each age 1259 
group) and the reordered pseudocollision (blue bars/right-hand bar for each age group).  1260 
 1261 
